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Abstract
In this paper, we present a generic, query-efficient black-box
attack against API call-based machine learning malware clas-
sifiers. We generate adversarial examples by modifying the
malware’s API call sequences and non-sequential features
(printable strings). The adversarial examples will be misclas-
sified by the target malware classifier without affecting the
malware’s functionality. In contrast to previous studies, our
attack minimizes the number of malware classifier queries
required. In addition, in our attack, the attacker must only
know the class predicted by the malware classifier; the at-
tacker knowledge of the malware classifier’s confidence score
is optional. We evaluate the attack effectiveness when attacks
are performed against a variety of malware classifier archi-
tectures, including recurrent neural network (RNN) variants,
deep neural networks, support vector machines, and gradient
boosted decision trees. Our attack success rate is about 98%
when the classifier’s confidence score is known and 88% when
just the classifier’s predicted class is known. We implement
four state-of-the-art query-efficient attacks and show that our
attack requires fewer queries and less knowledge about the at-
tacked model’s architecture than other existing query-efficient
attacks, making it practical for attacking cloud-based malware
classifiers at a minimal cost.
1 Introduction
Next generation anti-malware products use machine learning
and deep learning models instead of signatures and heuris-
tics, in order to detect previously unseen malware. API call
sequence-based classifiers, such as SentinelOne or Microsoft
ATP, provide state-of-the-art detection performance [1]. How-
ever, those classifiers are vulnerable to adversarial example
attacks. Adversarial examples are samples that are perturbed
(modified), so they will be incorrectly classified by the target
classifier. In this paper, we demonstrate a novel query-efficient
black-box attack against many types of malware classifiers, in-
cluding RNN variants. We implement our attack on malware
classifiers that are used to classify a process as malicious or be-
nign. This classification is-based on both API call sequences
and additional discrete features (e.g., printable strings). We
consider the challenging case of machine learning as a service
(MLaaS). Examples of such services are Amazon Machine
Learning and Google’s Cloud Prediction. In this case, the at-
tacker continuously queries the target malware classifier and
modifies the API call sequences the malware generates until
it is classified as benign. Since the attacker pays for every
query of the target malware classifier and therefore aims to
minimize the number of queries made to such a cloud-service
when performing an attack. Another reason for minimizing
the number of queries is that many queries from the same
computer might arouse suspicion of an adversarial attack at-
tempt, causing the cloud-service to stop responding to those
queries [7]. While the attacker may use a botnet to issue many
queries, this approach would increase the attack’s cost dra-
matically. We develop an end-to-end attack by recrafting the
malware behavior so it can evade detection by such machine
learning malware classifiers while minimizing the amount of
queries (meaning that it is, query-efficient).
The main focus of most existing research (e.g., [18, 27]) is
on the query-efficient generation of adversarial examples for
images. This is different from our work, which is focused on
generating adversarial API sequences, in two respects:
1. In the case of adversarial API sequences, one must verify
that the original functionality of the malware remains
intact. Thus, one cannot simply generate an adversarial
feature vector, but must also generate the corresponding
working malware behavior.
2. API sequences consist of discrete symbols of variable
lengths, while images are represented as matrices with
fixed dimensions, and the values of the matrices are con-
tinuous.
In this paper, we modify the malware’s behavior by modifying
the API call sequences it generates. We also modify static,
non-sequential features: printable strings inside the process.
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We present eight novel attacks that are different in terms of
three parameters:
1. Attacker knowledge - The attacker might have knowl-
edge about the target classifier’s confidence score (score-
based attack) or only about the predicted class (decision-
based attack). This knowledge can affect the way we
modify both the positions and the types of modified API
calls.
2. Modified API call types (values) - The attacker can either
modify API calls randomly (random perturbation) or
take them from a generative adversarial network (GAN)
generating benign samples (benign perturbation).
3. Number of modified API calls - The attacker can either
modify API calls until the sample successfully evades
detection with minimal perturbation (linear iteration at-
tack) or start with a maximum number of modifications
and minimize them as long as evasion is maintained
(logarithmic backtracking attack).
Each of the eight attacks we present is a combination of
these three techniques, each of which has two different op-
tions (score-based or decision-based; benign perturbation or
random perturbation; logarithmic backtracking or linear itera-
tion).
As a benchmark, we adapted four state-of-the-art query-
efficient attacks. We showed that our attacks outperform them,
obtaining a higher success rate (98% using the classifier’s
confidence score and 88% without it) for a fixed number of
queries.
The contributions of our paper are as follows:
1. This is the first query-efficient, end-to-end black-box ad-
versarial attack for both sequence and non-sequential
input. This paper also presents the first query-efficient
decision-based attack for RNNs. Our attack is stochas-
tic, and therefore, defense methods against deterministic
adversarial attacks, such as gradient masking (e.g., dis-
tillation), are expected to be ineffective against it [6].
2. While we focus on malware classifiers (a challenging
case due to the reasons mentioned above), our attack is
generic and can be applied to other discrete sequential
input from other domains, such as bioinformatics (using
nucleic acid sequences instead of API calls).
2 Background and Related Work
The search for adversarial examples, such as those used in
our attack, can be formalized as a minimization problem:
argr min f (x+ r) 6= f (x) s.t.x+ r ∈ D (1)
The input x, correctly classified by the classifier f , is per-
turbed with r, such that the resulting adversarial example x+r
remains in the input domain D but is assigned a different label
than x.
There are three types of adversarial example generation
methods:
In gradient-based attacks, adversarial perturbations are gen-
erated in the direction of the gradient, that is, in the direction
with the maximum effect on the classifier’s output (e.g., fast
gradient sign method [13]). Gradient-based attacks are ef-
fective but require adversarial knowledge about the targeted
classifier’s gradients.
Hu and Tan [15] used a RNN GAN to generate invalid API
calls and insert them into the original API sequences. Gumbel-
Softmax, a one-hot continuous distribution estimator, was
used to deliver gradient information between the generative
RNN and substitute RNN. A white-box gradient-based attack
against RNNs demonstrated against long short-term memory
(LSTM) architecture for sentiment classification of a movie
review dataset was shown in [21]. A black-box variant, which
facilitates the use of a substitute model, was presented in [23].
The attack in this paper is different in a few ways:
1. As shown in Section 4.2, the attack described in [23]
requires more target classifier queries and greater com-
puting power to generate a substitute model.
2. We use a different adversarial example generation al-
gorithm, which uses a stochastic approach rather than
a gradient-based approach, making it harder to defend
against (as mentioned in Section 6).
3. Our decision-based attack is generic and doesn’t require
a per malware pre-deployment phase to generate the
adversarial sequence (either using a GAN, as in [15],
or a substitute model, as in [23]). Moreover, generation
takes place at run time, making it even more generic and
easier to deploy.
score-based attacks are-based on knowledge of the target
classifier’s confidence score. The target classifier’s gradient
can be numerically derived from the confidence scores of
adjacent input points (a.k.a. ZOO: zeroth order optimization)
and then a gradient-based attack is applied, following the
direction of maximum impact, in order to generate an adver-
sarial example [9]. Previous research used a genetic algorithm
(GA), where the fitness of the genetic variants is defined in
terms of the target classifier’s confidence score, to generate
adversarial examples that bypass PDF malware and image
recognition classifiers, respectively [2,29]. Those attacks used
a computationally expensive GA compared to our approach
and were only evaluated when performed against support
vector machine (SVM), random forest, and CNN classifiers
using static features only, and was not evaluated against re-
current neural network variants using both static and dynamic
analysis features, as we do. [27] used the simultaneous per-
turbation stochastic approximation (SPSA) method, since its
gradient approximation requires only two queries (for the
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target classifier’s score) per iteration, regardless of the dimen-
sion of the optimization problem. Alzantot et al. [3] presented
a sequence-based attack algorithm that exploits population-
based gradient-free optimization via GA; in this study, the
attack was performed against a natural language processing
(NLP) sentiment analysis classifier. While this attack can be
used against RNN, its requires more queries than our attack
(see Table 3).
A common problem of all score-based attacks is that the
knowledge of confidence scores (which are not required by
our attack) is unlikely in black-box scenarios.
decision-based attacks only use the label predicted by the
target classifier. Brendel et al. [6] started from a randomly gen-
erated image classified as the target class and then added per-
turbations that decrease the distance to a source class image,
while maintaining the target classification. Ilyas et al. [18]
used natural evolutionary strategies (NES) optimization to
enable query-efficient gradient estimation, which leads to the
generation of misclassified images as seen in gradient-based
attacks. [24] uses Bayesian optimization to minimize the prob-
ability of the input to be correctly classified. Cheng et al. [10]
estimated the classifier’s confidence score at a decision bound-
ary point, which is identified using binary search, and then
used ZOO to estimate the target classifier’s gradient. Dang
et al. [12] used the rate of feature modifications from known
malicious and benign samples as the score and used a hill
climbing approach to minimize this score, evading SVM and
random forest PDF malware classifiers-based on static fea-
tures in an efficient manner. Our approach, on the other hand,
is more generic and can handle RNN classifiers and multiple
feature types.
All of the currently published score and decision-based
attacks differ from our proposed attack in that:
1. They only deal with CNNs, random forest, and SVM
classifiers using non sequential input, as opposed to all
state-of-the-art classifiers (including RNN variants) us-
ing discrete or sequence input, as in our attack.
2. They deal primarily with images and rarely fit the attack
requirements of the cyber security domain: while chang-
ing a pixel’s color doesn’t “break” the image, modifying
an API call might harm the malware functionality. In
addition, small perturbations, such as those suggested
in [18, 27], are not applicable for discrete API calls: you
can’t change WriteFile() to WriteFile()+0.001 in order to
estimate the gradient to perturb the adversarial example
in the right direction; you need to modify it to an entirely
different API. This is reflected in Table 3.
3. They did not present an end-to-end framework to imple-
ment the attack in the cyber security domain (Section
5.1). Thus, the attack might be used for generating ad-
versarial malware feature vectors but not for generating
a working adversarial malware sample. An exception
is [4], which presents a decision-based attack of a rein-
forcement learning agent which is equipped with a set
of operations (such as packing) that it can perform on
the PE file. Through a series of games played against the
anti-malware engine, the agent learns which sequences
of operations are likely to result in evading the detec-
tor for any given malware sample. Unlike our attack,
the attack effectiveness achieved is less than 25% (our
attack effectiveness is about 90%). This attack fails to
handle sequence features and is not query-efficient like
our attack.
The differences between those attacks and our attacks are
summerized in Table 1.
3 Methodology
3.1 Attacking API Call-Based Malware Clas-
sifier
An overview of the malware classification process is shown
in Figure 1. Assume a malware classifier whose input is a
sequence of API calls made by the inspected process. API
call sequences can be millions of API calls long, making it
impossible to train such a classifier on the entire sequence
at once, due to training time and GPU memory constraints.
Thus, the target classifier uses a sliding window approach [23]:
Each API call sequence is divided into windows of k API
calls. Detection is performed on each window in turn, and if
any window is classified as malicious, the entire sequence is
considered malicious. Thus, even cases such as malicious pay-
loads injected into goodware (e.g., using Metasploit), where
only a small subset of the sequence is malicious, would be
detected. We use one-hot encoding for each API call type
in order to cope with the limitations of scikit-learn’s imple-
mentation of decision trees and random forests, as mentioned
online. The output of each classifier is either the predicted
class (whether the API call trace is malicious or benign) or the
confidence score of the prediction (a value between 0.0 for a
benign process to 1.0 for a malicious process). The classifiers
used in our study and their hyperparameters are described in
Appendix B.
In order to attack such a malware classifier, we want to add
API calls without harming the malware functionality. Remov-
ing API calls without modifying the malware functionality
requires manual analysis of the malware code and thus cannot
be scaled. Therefore, we use a no-op mimicry attack [28], that
is, we add API calls with no effect or an irrelevant effect. Al-
most every API call can become a no-op if provided with the
right arguments, e.g., opening a non-existent file. We focus
on malware classifiers that use only the API call type and
not its arguments or return value, since malware classifiers
that verify the arguments are 4-10 times slower than malware
classifiers that do not verify arguments [25] and are therefore
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Table 1: Comparison to Previous Work
Attack Type Domain Input Type Query-
Efficient?
Score/Decision-
Based?
Rosenberg et al. [23]
(Gradient-Based Attack)
Cyber Security Sequence, Non-sequential, Mixed No Decision
Uesato et al. [27] Image Recognition Non-sequential Yes Score
Ilyas et al. [18] Image Recognition Non-sequential Yes Score
Alzantot et al. [2] NLP Sequence Yes Score
Our Score-Based Attack Cyber Security Sequence, Non-sequential, Mixed Yes Score
Our Decision-Based
Attack
Cyber Security Sequence, Non-sequential, Mixed Yes Decision
less common. However, analyzing arguments would make
our attack easier to detect, e.g., by considering only success-
ful API calls and ignoring failed API calls, or by looking for
irregularities in the arguments of the API calls (e.g., invalid
file handles, etc.). In order to address this issue, we use valid
(non-null) arguments with a no-op effect, such as writing into
a temporary file handle (instead of an invalid file handle), or
reading zero bytes from a valid file. This makes detecting
the no-op API calls much harder, since the API call runs cor-
rectly, with a return value indicative of success. It is extremely
challenging for the malware classifier to differentiate between
malware that is trying to read a non-existent registry key as an
added adversarial no-op, and a benign application functional-
ity, e.g., trying to find a registry key containing information
from previous runs and creating it if it doesn’t exist (for in-
stance, during the first run of the application). We don’t add
API types which cannot be no-opped and always affect the
malware functionality. In this study, we focus on the 314 API
call types monitored by Cuckoo Sandbox. Of those, only two
API call types are not added because they can’t be no-opped:
ExitWindowsEx() and NtTerminateProcess(). A more generic
handling of API call arguments, to prevent the malware clas-
sifier from ignoring hard-coded arguments that would cause a
no-op (thereby mitigating our attack), is discussed in Section
5.2.
3.2 The Proposed Black-Box Attacks
As mentioned before, our proposed attacks can be charac-
terized by the knowledge the attacker has, the method for
selecting which new API call to add, and the number of API
calls added.
We present three simple but effective methods to reduce
the number of queries needed for generating an adversarial
example:
1. Attacker knowledge - Assuming that the attacker has
access to the confidence score of the malware classifier,
we propose a score-based attack that uses a gradient free
optimization algorithm that until now has never been
used for adversarial learning. This attack is designed for
discrete values in sequences of variable length. Thus,
it fits API call sequences, as opposed to image pixels
which were the focus of most previous research.
2. Added API call selection - In order to select the new
API calls to add, we propose the benign perturbation
method. In this method, instead of adding random API
calls, we add API calls selected from sequences gen-
erated by a generative adversarial network (GAN) that
has been trained to mimic real benign sequences. This
concept is inspired by the modus operandi of biological
viruses (malware) which are sometimes composed of
human (“benign”) proteins in order to evade the immune
system (malware classifier) of the host.
3. Number of API calls to add - We propose logarithmic
backtracking transformation as a method to determine
the number of API calls to add. This method starts with a
large ratio of perturbation (that is, a larger number of API
calls added to the original sequence to fool the classifier)
which rapidly decreases as long as the sequence remains
misclassified.
The abovementioned techniques are described in the subsec-
tions that follow.
3.2.1 Decision-Based API Calls Window Attack
First, in Algorithm 1, we show how to generate an adversarial
sequence for a single API call window (out of the entire API
call sequence). The sequence is generated based on queries to
the black-box malware classifier, in which the classifier only
returns the class prediction and not its confidence score (i.e.,
a decision-based attack).
The perturbation added is either random API calls, a.k.a.
random perturbation (line 12), or API calls of a benign se-
quence, a.k.a. benign perturbation (line 10). Since only the
predicted class is available, the API calls are being added at a
random position i in the API sequence (line 8). The adversary
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1 Input: f (black-box model), wm (malicious sequence to perturb, of length lm ≤ n),
2 wb (benign sequence to mimic, of length lb ≤ n), n (size of adversarial sliding window),
3 D
′
(adversarial vocabulary), Mw (maximum API modifications per window), PerturbType ( benign or random perturbation),
4 AddingAPIsMethod (logarithmic backtracking or linear iteration)
5 addedAPIs = {}
6 while ((AddingAPIsMethod is linear iteration) and ( f (wm) = malicious)) or (|addedAPIs|< Mw):
7 # The number of added API calls< Mw
8 Randomly select an API’s position i in wm
9 if PerturbType is benign perturbation:
10 Add wb[i] to wm at position i
11 else: PerturbType is random perturbation
12 Add a random API in D
′
to wm in position i
13 #Add an adversarial API in wm[i];wm[i..n] become wm[i+1..n+1]
14 Add the new API and its position to addedAPIs
15 return (perturbed) wm,addedAPIs
Algorithm 1: Single Iteration decision-based Window Sequence Generation
randomly chooses i, since he/she does not have a better way to
select i without incurring significant statistical overhead. Note
that the addition of an API call at position i means that the API
calls from position i..n (wm[i..n] ) are “pushed back” one po-
sition to make room for the new API call, in order to maintain
the original sequence and preserve the original functionality
of the code (comment in line 13). Since the sliding window
has a fixed length, the last API call, wm[n+1], is “pushed out”
and removed from wm. This API call addition continues until
the modified sequence wm is classified as benign or more than
Mw API calls are added, reaching the maximum overhead
limit (line 6). In the case of a linear iteration attack, the API
calls are added one at a time, checking whether the perturbed
sequence evades detection after each addition. The case of a
logarithmic backtracking attack will be explained below.
D is the vocabulary of available features. In this case, those
features are all of the API call types recorded by the malware
classifier, e.g., CreateFileW(). Note that D is not necessarily
known to the attacker. The attacker knows D
′
, which might be
a subset or superset of D. This knowledge of D
′
is a commonly
accepted assumption about the attacker’s knowledge [16]. In
fact, it is enough for the attacker to know the feature type used
by the target classifier (API call types in this study), which
is public information that is usually published by classifier
implementers. With that knowledge, the attacker can cover all
API call types (several thousands) to generate D
′
, which is
superset of D. In our research, we observed that API call types
in D′−D are not monitored by the classifier and thus adding
them does not assist in creating adversarial examples; those
API calls just add API call overhead to the modified sequence
and waste queries. API call types in D−D′, unknown to
the attacker, are not be generated by the attack and therefore
decrease the adversarial feature space and thus decreasing the
possibilities for generating modified sequences that can evade
detection. Thus, when D
′
is a superset of D, the attack has
higher overhead but remains as effective.
3.2.2 Score-Based API Calls Window Attack
In the previous subsection, we discussed a decision-based
attack, where the malware classifier returns just the malicious
or benign predicted class for the analyzed sequence. However,
when the confidence score of the malware classifier is also
returned, score-based attacks (e.g., gradient free optimization
algorithms) can be applied as well. The merged flow for both
attacks is described in Algorithm 2. Assuming the attacker
has a budget of B queries per API call window, the call to
Algorithm 1 inside the while loop in line 7 of Algorithm 2 can
be replaced with B− logn iterations (line 9) of minimizing
f (wm) (lines 11 or 13) by one of the score minimization
algorithms presented in Section 4.2.2. In order to use the
same budget for all attacks, we chose B = Mw (lines 7, 9).
All random perturbation variants try to minimize the target
classifier score by modifying only the values of the added
API call types (while the API call positions are random but
fixed, as in Algorithm 1). Trying to modify both API types
and positions with the same budget results in inferior perfor-
mance (that is not shown due to space limits). All benign
perturbation variants try to minimize the score by modifying
only the API positions (while the API types are taken from the
GAN’s output). The maximum additional API calls allowed
per sliding window was set to 70 (50%). The search space for
this optimization would be either the Mw added API call type
values (out of |D| values each) if this is a random perturbation,
or the Mw added API call indices in the adversarial window
(each with n possible values) if this is a benign perturbation.
Score-Based Query-Efficient Attack for Discrete Input
Sequence Most state-of-the-art query-efficient attacks for
images assume continuous input ( [18, 27]) and underper-
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form when used for discrete input (e.g., API calls or position
indices), as shown in Table 3. One exception are genetic algo-
rithms (GAs), which use mutation (random perturbation) in
existing adversarial candidates and crossover between several
candidates (i.e., a combination of parts of several candidates).
GAs work well with discrete sequences [3]. However, while
crossover makes sense in the NLP domain (e.g., for compound
sentences), it makes little sense for API call sequences, where
each program has its own business logic. Another issue is the
poor performance of a fixed mutation rate, usually used by
GAs. It is better to use an adaptive mutation rate, which fits
itself to the domain without knowledge expertise [11].
We decided to use the self-adaptive uniform mixing evolu-
tionary algorithm (EA) proposed by Dang et al. [11]. It starts
with a population of adversarial candidates and in every gen-
eration, a new population of candidates is produced, and the
old generation dies. Besides the adversarial sequence, each
candidate carries an additional property: its mutation rate.
Each new candidate is produced in the same way:
1. The best of two uniformly selected individuals is selected
(i.e., tournament selection).
2. The selected parent individual changes its mutation rate
between two mutation rates: low and high, with a fixed
probability p. We used the same values as proposed
in [11].
3. The parent replicates, with mutations occurring at the
new mutation rate.
Although the selection mechanism does not take into account
the mutation rate, the intuition is that appropriate mutation
rates are correlated with high fitness.
3.2.3 Full Sequence Linear Iteration and Logarithmic
Backtracking Attacks
In order to handle the entire API call sequence, we use Algo-
rithm 3. In this algorithm, the attacker splits the malicious API
call sequence xm into windows of n API calls (wmj ), similar to
the division made by the malware classifier, and modifies each
window in turn using Algorithm 2. The API calls “pushed
out” from wmj will become the beginning of w
m
j+1, so no API
is ignored. The adversarial window size n might be different
from the malware classifier’s window size k, which is not
known to the attacker. As shown in Section 4.2, this has a neg-
ligible effect on the attack performance. In case of a benign
perturbation, the benign API call sequence xb is also similarly
split into windows of n API calls (wbj ).
The adversarial API call sequence length of l might be
larger than n, the length of the sliding window API call se-
quence that is used by the adversary. Therefore, the attack
is performed sequentially on
⌈ l
n
⌉
windows of n API calls.
Note that the knowledge of k (the window size of the malware
classifier) is not required, as shown in Section 4.2.
In order to decrease the number of malware classifier
queries (the number of calls to f (.)), we can use logarith-
mic backtracking. In this case, we only query the malware
classifier in Algorithm 3 after modifying Mw API calls in
Algorithm 1, which should be a sufficiently large perturbation
to evade the malware classifier. Then, we start reducing the
number of modified API calls by half (lines 11-12) until the
malware classifier detects the sample again. Finally, we keep
restoring half of the API calls we previously removed (line
20), until we achieve a perturbation that fools the malware
classifier with a minimal number of additional API calls and
malware classifier queries.
In Algorithm 1, the attacker chooses the API calls to add
and remove randomly. Note that we do not remove the mal-
ware’s original API calls (only the no-op API calls that were
previously added by the adversary), in order to prevent harm
to its functionality. Since we add or remove half of the API
calls each time, we perform O(logn) queries per adversarial
sliding window if AddingAPIsMethod is logarithmic back-
tracking, instead of the O(n) queries that are performed if
AddingAPIsMethod is linear iteration, where n is the size of
the adversarial sliding window. While the proposed attack
is designed for API call-based classifiers, it can be used for
any adversarial sequence generation. The benign sequence xb
is generated by a specially crafted GAN, which is described
below.
3.2.4 Benign Perturbation: GAN Generated Benign
API Call Sequence
When the attacker adds an API call to our adversarial se-
quence, he or she wants to have the maximum impact on the
classifier’s score. Thus, Algorithm 3 can take xb, a benign API
sequence to use, as input. The idea is that adding a “benign”
API call would make the trace “more benign” than adding a
random API call. One way to generate xb is by taking the API
call sequence of an actual benign sample from our dataset.
The downside of this approach is that those hard-coded API
calls can be detected explicitly as an evasion attack. A better
approach is to generate a different benign sequence each time,
using a generative model. One way to do this is to use a gen-
erative adversarial network, with a stochastic input seed and
output of an API call sequence that is indistinguishable (to the
discriminator classifier) from actual benign sequences from
the dataset. This approach is rarely used for API call sequence
generation, but it has been used for text generation. In compar-
ison to other approaches (e.g., VAE), a GAN tends to generate
better output. Most other methods require that the generative
model has some particular functional form (like a Gaussian
output layer). Moreover, all of the other approaches require
that the generative model puts non-zero mass everywhere.
However, a challenge with the GAN approach is that the dis-
crete outputs from the generative model make it difficult to
pass the gradient update from the discriminative model to the
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1 Input: f (black-box model), wm (malicious sequence to perturb, of length lm ≤ n),
2 wb (benign sequence to mimic, of length lb ≤ n), n (size of adversarial sliding window), D′ (adversarial vocabulary),
3 Mw (maximum API modifications per window), PerturbType (benign or random perturbation),
4 AddingAPIsMethod (logarithmic backtracking or linear iteration), AttackerKnowledge (decision or score-based)
5 if AttackerKnowledge is decision-based:
6 while ( f (wm) = malicious) :
7 wm,addedAPIs = Algorithm1( f ,wm,wb,n,D
′
,Mw,PerturbType,AddingAPIsMethod)}
8 else: #AttackerKnowledge is score-based
9 optimIterationsCount = Mw− lgn if AddingAPIsMethod is logarithmic backtracking, else optimIterationsCount = Mw
10 if PerturbType is benign perturbation:
11 wm,addedAPIs = ScoreMinimizationAlgorithm( f (wm),optimIterationsCount,addedAPIIndices)
12 else: # PerturbType is random perturbation:
13 wm,addedAPIs = ScoreMinimizationAlgorithm( f (wm),optimIterationsCount,addedAPIValues)
14 return (perturbed) wm,addedAPIs
Algorithm 2: score-based or decision-based Window Sequence Generation
1 Input: f (black-box model), xm (malicious sequence to perturb), xb (benign sequence to mimic),
2 n (size of adversarial sliding window), D
′
(adversarial vocabulary), Mw (maximum API modifications per window),
3 PerturbType (benign or random perturbation), AddingAPIsMethod (logarithmic backtracking or linear iteration),
4 AttackerKnowledge (decision or score-based)
5 for each sliding windows wmj ,wbj of n API calls in xm,xb:
6 wmj ,addedAPIs = Algorithm2( f ,w
m
j ,w
b
j ,n,D
′
,Mw,PerturbType,AddingAPIsMethod,AttackerKnowledge)}
7 if AddingAPIsMethod is logarithmic backtracking:
8 remainingAPIs = addedAPIs
9 while ( f (wmj ) = benign):
10 # Remove added API calls until evasion is lost:
11 Randomly split addedAPIs into two equally sized groups: remainingAPIs,deletedAPIs
12 remove deletedAPIs from wmj
13 if f (wmj ) = malicious :
14 Remove remainingAPIs instead of deletedAPIs from wmj
15 Switch between remainingAPIs and deletedAPIs
16 recoveredAPIs = deletedAPIs
17 while ( f (wmj ) = malicious):
18 # While there are still added API calls that were removed, add them back until evasion is restored:
19 recoveredAPIs =Randomly pick half of the API calls remaining in deletedAPIs
20 Add recoveredAPIs to wmj
21 return (perturbed) xm
Algorithm 3: Full Sequence Attack
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generative model. Another challenge is that the discriminative
model can only assess a complete input sequence. We used Se-
qGAN [30] implementation, in which a discriminative model
is trained to minimize the binary classification loss between
real benign API call sequences and generated ones. Besides
the pretraining procedure that follows the MLE (maximum
likelihood estimation) metric, the generator is modeled as a
stochastic policy in reinforcement learning (RL), bypassing
the gradient update challenge by directly performing a gradi-
ent policy update. Given the API sequence st = [x0,x1, ..xt−1]
and the next API to be sampled from the model xt ∼ (x|st), the
RL algorithm, REINFORCE, optimizes the GAN objective:
min
φ
− E
Y∼pdata
[
logDφ(Y )
]− E
Y∼GΘ
[
log(1−Dφ(Y ))
]
(2)
The RL reward signal comes from the GAN discriminator
is judged on a complete sequence. It is passed back to the
intermediate state-action steps using Monte Carlo search, to
compute the Q-value to generate each token. This approach
facilitates variance reduction. We also tried other GAN ar-
chitectures (e.g., GSGAN), but SeqGAN outperformed all
of them. SeqGAN outperformed the random perturbation as
well, as shown in Section 4.2.
4 Experimental Evaluation
4.1 Dataset and Target Malware Classifiers
We use the same dataset used in [23], because of its size: it
contains 500,000 files (250,000 benign samples and 250,000
malware samples), faithfully representing the malware fami-
lies in the wild and providing a proper setting for an attack
comparison. Details about the dataset are provided in Ap-
pendix A. Each sample was run in Cuckoo Sandbox, a mal-
ware analysis system, for two minutes per sample. The API
call sequences generated by the inspected code were extracted
from the JSON report generated by Cuckoo Sandbox. The ex-
tracted API call sequences are used as the malware classifier’s
features. The samples were run on Windows 8.1 OS, since
most malware targets the Windows OS. Anti-sandbox mal-
ware were filtered to prevent dataset contamination (see Ap-
pendix A). After filtering, the final training set size is 360,000
samples, 36,000 of which serve as the validation set. The
test set size is 36,000 samples. All sets are balanced between
malicious and benign samples.
There are no commercial trail version or open source API
call-based deep learning malware classifier available (such
commercial products target enterprises and involve supervised
server installation). Dynamic models are also not available in
VirusTotal. Therefore, we used the malware classifiers shown
in Appendix B. Many classifiers are covered, allowing us to
evaluate the attack effectiveness for many types of classifiers.
The API call sequences are split into windows of k API calls
each, and each window is classified in turn. Thus, the input of
each of the classifiers is a vector of k = 140 (larger window
sizes, such as k = 1,000, didn’t improve the classifier’s accu-
racy) API call types with 314 possible values (those monitored
by Cuckoo Sandbox, mentioned online). The implementation
and hyperparameters (loss function, dropout, activation func-
tions, etc.) of the target classifiers are described in Appendix
B. On the test set, all of the DNN classifiers achieve over 95%
accuracy, and all other classifiers reach over 90% accuracy.
The classifiers’ false positive rate ranged from 0.5 to 1%.
4.2 Attack Performance
4.2.1 Attack Performance Metrics
In order to measure the performance of an attack, we consider
three factors:
The attack effectiveness is the percentage of malicious sam-
ples which were correctly classified by the malware classifier
for which the adversarial sequence xm∗ generated by Algo-
rithm 3 was misclassified as benign by the malware classifier:
attack_effectiveness=
|{ f (xm) = Malicious∨ f (xm∗) = Benign}|
|{ f (xm) = Malicious}|
(3)
s.t. xm ∈ TestSet( f )
We also consider the average number of malware classifier
queries the attack performs per adversarial example before it
is classified as benign by the malware classifier. The attacker
aims to minimize this number, since in cloud scenarios, each
query costs money and increases the probability of adversarial
attempt detection.
Finally, we consider the attack overhead, that is, the fraction
of API calls which were added by Algorithm 3 to the malware
samples, out of the total number of samples’ API calls:
attack_overhead = avg(
length(xm∗)− length(xm)
length(xm)
) (4)
The average length of the API call sequence is:
avg(length(xm))≈ 10,000. We used a maximum of Mw = 70
additional API calls per window of k = 140 API calls, lim-
iting the perturbation run-time overhead (per window and
thus per sample) to 50% in the worst case. While not shown
here due to space limits, higher Mw values cause higher attack
effectiveness, overhead, and queries.
Adversarial attack against images usually tries to minimize
the number of modified pixels in order to evade human detec-
tion of the perturbation. One might claim that such definition
of minimal perturbation is irrelevant for API call traces: hu-
man cannot inspect sequences of thousands or millions of
APIs, so an attacker can add an unlimited amount of API
8
calls.However, one should bare in mind that a malware aims
to perform its malicious functionality as fast as possible. For
instance, ransomware usually starts by encrypting the most
critical files (e.g., the ’My Documents’ folder) first, so even
if the user turns off the computer and sends the hard-drive to
IT - damage is already be done. The same is true for a key-
logger - it aims to send the user passwords to the attacker as
soon as possible, so they can be used immediately, before the
malware is to be detected and neutralized. Moreover, adding
too much API calls would cause the modified program’s pro-
file to become anomalous, making it easier to be detected
by anomaly detection intrusion detection systems, e.g., those
who measure CPU usage [20], or contain irregular API call
subsequences [14].
4.2.2 Comparison to Previous Work
Decision-Based Attack Performance We provide a com-
parison of our attack against the attack of Rosenberg et al.
2018 [23], since it provides state-of-the-art performance for
gradient-based attacks against a wide range of classifiers. Hu
and Tan’s attack [15] has inferior performance, but more im-
portantly, the use of target classifier queries to train a gener-
ative adversarial network in Hu and Tan’s research requires
even more queries than training a simple substitute model [23]
due to the GAN’s complexity and convergence issues [5].
A comparison of the attack effectiveness and attack over-
head of our decision-based attack with logarithmic backtrack-
ing transformation and benign perturbation (Algorithm 3) to
Rosenberg et al. is presented in Table 2 (an average of five
runs, with 200 queries).
As can be seen in Table 2, the proposed attack has high
effectiveness for all of the malware classifiers tested. The
attack effectiveness is lower for traditional machine learning
algorithms, e.g., for SVM and logistic regression. This is due
to the linear correlations between their features, which cause
many API calls in the sequence to have a low weight; mod-
ifying those API calls has little impact. In contrast, neural
networks have many layers of nonlinear correlations between
the features, so modifying the correct API would have signifi-
cant impact on the target classifier’s output. This is also true
for gradient boosted decision tree (GBDT), with many (100)
shallow trees, as opposed to random forest with a few (10)
deep trees, making it less linear and more vulnerable to our
attacks. The score-based attack variants mentioned below also
provide similar or higher attack effectiveness for all classifiers
(this is not discussed further due to space limits).
For the LSTM classifier (the same as in Table 2), the av-
erage number of target classifier queries used per sample is
142.9 with benign perturbation and 169.9 with random per-
turbation (average of five runs), while the attack of Rosen-
berg et al. necessitated 2258.4 queries, a difference of more
than an order of magnitude. As mentioned in Section 4.1,
|TestSet( f )| = 36,000 samples, and the test set TestSet( f )
is balanced, so the attack performance was measured on:
|{ f (xm) = Malicious|xm ∈ TestSet( f )}|= 18,000 samples.
For simplicity, we used k = n for Algorithm 1, i.e., the slid-
ing window size of the adversary is the same as that used by
the target classifier. However, even if this is not the case, the
attack effectiveness is not significantly degraded. If n < k, the
adversary can only modify a subset of the API calls affect-
ing the target classifier, and this subset might not be diverse
enough to affect the classification as desired, thereby reduc-
ing the attack effectiveness. If n > k, the adversary would
keep trying to modify different API calls’ positions in Al-
gorithm 1, until he/she modifies the ones impacting the tar-
get classifier as well, thereby increasing the attack overhead
without affecting the attack effectiveness. For instance, when
n = 100, k = 140, there is an average decrease in attack ef-
fectiveness from 87.96% to 87.94% for an LSTM classifier.
The closer n and k are, the better the attack performance. We
used D′ = D−{ExitWindowsEx(),NtTerminateProcess()},
so D′ does not contain any API type that might harm the
code’s functionality. From the 314 API calls monitored by
Cuckoo Sandbox, only two API types were omitted: ExitWin-
dowsEx() and NtTerminateProcess().
Score-Based Attack Performance There are no published
query-efficient adversarial attacks against RNN variants. At-
tacks that minimize the number of queries exist, but they only
work against CNNs [2, 18]. Those attacks aren’t relevant, be-
cause they don’t work with sequence input and discrete values.
To address this gap, we used Nevergrad to implement discrete
sequence input variants of a few state-of-the-art score-based
adversarial attacks:
1. SPSA-based attack (Uesato et al. [27])
2. NES-based attack (Ilyas et al. [18])
3. GA-based attack (Alzantot et al. [2])
4. Our uniform mixing EA attack (described in Section
3.2.2)
We didn’t implement the ZOO attack of Chen et al. [9], be-
cause it has already been evaluated and found to be less effec-
tive than both SPSA and NES attacks [27].
We used Nevergrad’s default arguments for all attacks.
The attack performance (average of five runs) for the LSTM
classifier with a fixed budget of 100 and 200 queries (with
the exception of the gradient-based attack, which uses 2258.4
queries) is presented in Table 3 for random perturbation at-
tacks and in Table 4 for benign perturbation attacks. The
last two lines of each table pertain to our eight previously de-
scribed attacks (all combinations of: logarithmic backtracking
or linear iteration, benign or random perturbation, score-based
or decision-based), each for the two fixed budgets. Other clas-
sifiers and budgets, not shown due to space limits, resulted
in similar relative trends: a higher budget results in increased
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Table 2: Decision-Based Attack Performance
Classifier Type Attack
Effectiveness [%]
Our Attack
Attack
Effectiveness [%]
Rosenberg et al.
2018 [23]
Additional API
Calls [%]
Our Attack
Additional API
Calls [%]
Rosenberg et al.
2018 [23]
BRNN 89.85 99.90 7.60 0.017
LSTM 87.96 99.99 22.22 0.017
Deep LSTM 89.95 99.31 22.71 0.029
BLSTM 76.04 93.48 22.18 0.029
GRU 89.57 100.0 21.47 0.016
1D CNN 89.97 95.66 4.10 0.049
Logistic Regression 58.64 69.73 4.43 0.007
Random Forest 89.42 99.44 5.20 0.009
SVM 60.22 70.90 3.82 0.007
Gradient Boosted Tree 58.84 71.45 13.99 0.027
attack effectiveness. Note that here we use a fixed number of
queries and try to maximize the attack effectiveness for the
specified number of queries, since this is the most common
real-world scenario.
The difference between the number of queries required by
the gradient-based attack and the other attacks is due to the
fact that the substitute model creation requires many target
classifier queries. One might claim that the same substitute
model can be used to camouflage more than ten malware sam-
ples, resulting in a lower average budget per sample. However,
this is not a realistic scenario, as an attacker usually tries to
modify only a single malware, so it can bypass the detector
and perform its malicious functionality. Moreover, even if the
average cost per example can be reduced by using the same
substitute model, our attack presents a much lower bound limit
on the absolute number of queries, bypassing a cloud-service
that blocks access for a host performing too many queries in a
short amount of time in order to thwart adversarial efforts [7].
The more efficient the attack the less chances there are for it
to be mitigated by this approach.
The attack overhead of all attacks is similar: about 30%,
or 40 API calls per window. Since a classifier with an API
window size of k = 100 provides roughly the same accuracy
as one with k = 140 used here (96.76% vs. 97.61% with the
same FP rate for LSTM classifier), the success of these attacks
is due to the perturbation and not because API sequences were
split into two windows due to the added API calls.
As can be seen, the attacks of Uesato et al. and Ilyas et
al. have low effectiveness. This is due to the fact that those
attacks don’t suitable for discrete values of API call types
and indices. In contrast, we see that our our uniform mixing
EA score-based attack has a higher attack effectiveness, for
a fixed number of queries, even when used for discrete input
(API calls or position indices). This is due to the fact that the
transformations used by EA work with discrete sequences:
mutation (random perturbation) in existing adversarial can-
didates and crossover between several candidates). In our
EA score-based attack, we don’t use crossover, which might
make sense for the NLP domain (e.g., for compound sen-
tences), but not for API call sequences, where each program
has its own business logic. Our score-based attack outper-
forms all other score-based attack variants and has similar
attack effectiveness as the gradient-based attack with 90%
less queries required (84.77% for 100 queries and 97.53% for
200 queries, as shown in Table 3).
Since our main objective in this paper is minimizing the
number of queries, our proposed score-based attack outper-
forms existing methods.
As expected, the benign perturbation effect on the decision-
based attack effectiveness is the most significant, since with-
out it the API types are random. While our decision-based
attack effectiveness is 10% lower than the most effective
score-based attacks when using the same budget, it doesn’t
require knowledge of the target classifier’s confidence score,
making it the only viable attack in some black-box scenarios.
4.2.3 Benign Perturbation GAN Comparison
To implement the benign perturbation GAN, we tested several
GAN types, using Texygen [32] with its default parameters.
We use maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) training as
the pretraining process for all baseline models except GS-
GAN, which requires no pretraining. In pretraining, we first
train 80 epochs for a generator, and then train 80 epochs for a
discriminator. The adversarial training comes next. In each
adversarial epoch, we update the generator once and then up-
date the discriminator for 15 mini-batch gradients. Due to
memory limitations, we generated only one sliding window
of 140 API calls, each with 314 possible API call types, in
each iteration (that is, generating wb and not xb as described
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Table 3: Random Perturbation Attack Effectiveness Comparison for a Fixed Number of Queries
Logarithmic Backtracking No No Yes Yes
Number of Queries 100 200 100 200
Rosenberg et al. [23] (Gradient-Based Attack) 99.99 99.99 NA NA
Uesato et al. [27] 2.37 2.73 5.17 5.95
Ilyas et al. [18] 37.50 43.14 43.78 50.37
Alzantot et al. [2] 54.68 62.91 62.06 71.40
Our Score-Based Attack 58.75 67.59 69.28 79.71
Our Decision-Based Attack 19.86 21.25 39.49 42.25
Table 4: Benign Perturbation Attack Effectiveness Comparison for a Fixed Number of Queries
Logarithmic Backtracking No No Yes Yes
Number of Queries 100 200 100 200
Rosenberg et al. [23] (Gradient-Based Attack) 99.99 99.99 NA NA
Uesato et al. [27] 6.56 7.55 14.31 16.46
Ilyas et al. [18] 66.23 76.19 77.32 88.96
Alzantot et al. [2] 68.49 81.09 79.93 91.96
Our Score-Based Attack 71.90 82.70 84.77 97.53
Our Decision-Based Attack 41.34 44.24 82.21 87.96
in Algorithm 3). We tested several GAN implementations
with discrete sequence output. We trained our GAN using a
benign hold out set (3,000 sequences). Next, we run Algo-
rithm 3 (logarithmic backtracking transformation with benign
perturbation) on the 3,000 API call traces generated by the
GAN. Finally, we used the benign test set (3,000 sequences)
as the GAN’s test set. The results for the LSTM classifier (the
results for other classifiers, which are not shown due to space
limits, are similar) are shown in Table 5.
We can see from the table that SeqGAN outperforms all
of the other models in all of the measured factors, due to
its RL-based ability to pass gradient updates between the
generator and discriminator parts of the GAN. We also see
that, as expected, a random perturbation is less effective than
a benign perturbation, regardless of the GAN type used.
5 Implementing End-to-End Attack
5.1 Implementing End-to-End Framework
In order to implement our decision-based adversarial at-
tack end-to-end and add the API calls to a malware binary,
we developed BADGER (Benign API aDversarial Generic
Example by Random perturbation) framework. This is an
end-to-end attack generation framework that receives, as in-
put, a malware binary to evade a target malware classifier
( f in Algorithm 1), and optionally (for benign perturbation)
receives an API call sequence classified as benign by f (xb
in Algorithm 3) as input. The framework outputs a modified
malware binary whose API call sequence is misclassified by
f as benign with high probability (Table 2).
BADGER was inspired by GADGET, the framework im-
plemented in [23]. Both frameworks contain the following
features:
1. The same code works for every adversarial sample (i.e.,
no adversarial example-specific code is written). This
makes the framework more robust to modification of the
malware classifier model, preventing another session of
malware code modification and testing.
2. No access to the malware source code is needed (only
access to the malware binary executable is needed).
However, unlike GADGET, our code is not malware sample-
specific, and with BADGER, no predeployment phase is
needed before the framework can run on a remote machine.
This makes BADGER easier to use and deploy. This also sup-
ports evasive lateral movement between hosts with different
malware classifiers, because the code generated is effective
against every malware classifier and is not targeted to a spe-
cific substitute model. The configuration used by BADGER
only contains the GAN-generated benign API call sequence
(which is the same for every malware being camouflaged),
instead of the malware-specific API additions, as done in
GADGET. In BADGER, those additions are performed ran-
domly throughout the malware API call trace during run-time.
The implementation is similar to GADGET: wrapping the
malware binary with proxy code between the malware code
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Table 5: Benign Perturbation Attack Performance
GAN Type Attack
Effectiveness [%]
Additional API
Calls [%]
Target Classifier’s
Queries
None (Random Perturbation) 21.25 27.94 119.40
SeqGAN [30] 89.39 12.82 17.73
TextGAN [31] 74.53 16.74 30.58
GSGAN [19] 88.19 14.06 20.43
MaliGAN [8] 86.67 15.12 22.74
and the OS DLLs that implement the API calls (e.g., ker-
nel32.dll). The wrapper code implements Algorithm 1 to
generate the adversarial sequence for the malware binary.
This is done by hooking all of the API calls that the attacker
believes are monitored by the malware classifier (D
′
in Algo-
rithm 1). These hooks call the original API calls (to preserve
the original malware functionality), keep track of the API
sequences executed so far, and call the adversarial example’s
additional API calls in the proper position. This means that the
additional API calls will be monitored by the malware clas-
sifier. Those API calls are either random (the case in which
PerturbType is random perturbation in Algorithm 1) or-based
on the configuration file, containing the GAN-based API call
trace classified as benign by the target classifier (the case in
which PerturbType is benign perturbation in Algorithm 1).
Like GADGET, we generated a new malware binary that
contains the wrapper’s hooks by using IAT Patcher to patch
the malware binary’s import address table (IAT), redirecting
the IAT’s API calls’ addresses to the matching C++ wrapper
API hook implementation and adding special hooks for the
LdrGetProcedureAddress()\GetProcAddress() hook to handle
dynamic library calls transparently.
The code is a proof of concept and does not cover all cor-
ner cases, e.g., packing the wrapper code to evade statically
signing it as malicious (dynamic analysis of it is challenging,
since its functionality is implemented inline, without external
API calls) or wrapping a packed malware, which requires
special handling for the IAT patching to work.
5.2 Handling API Arguments
We now modify our attack to evade classifiers that analyze
API call arguments in addition to the API call type. In order
to represent the API call arguments, we used Malware Instruc-
tion Set (MIST) [26], as was done in other studies [22]. MIST
is a representation for monitored behavior of malicious soft-
ware, optimized for the analysis of behavior using machine
learning. Each API call translates to an instruction. Each in-
struction has levels of information. The main idea underlying
this arrangement is to move “noisy” elements, such as the
loading address of a DLL, to the end of an instruction, while
discriminative patterns, such as the loaded DLL file path, are
kept at the beginning of the instruction. We used malware
classifiers trained with MIST level 2 instructions/arguments.
To handle MIST arguments, we modified our attack in the
following way: Each of the MIST level 2 arguments are ran-
domized from a set of possible no-op alternatives. A diverse
range of alternative values for each argument is crucial to pre-
vent the defender from signing specific no-op argument values
as malicious indicators, e.g., a file path is chosen from several
temporary file paths, a URL is selected from a range of valid
URLs like www.google.com. When an adversarial API needs
to be added, the API call type is chosen randomly or-based
on our GAN (as described in Section 4.2), and the arguments
are randomly selected from the range of alternative values
for each MIST level 2 argument. When using Mw = 35 (the
maximum number of API call additions allowed per window
of size k = 140 API calls) to reduce the attack overhead, we
achieved an attack effectiveness of 73.62% for our decision-
based variant (with overhead of 21.43%).
Handling other API arguments (and not MIST level 2 ar-
guments) would be similar but require more preprocessing
(generating random possibilities for every argument, etc.) with
a negligible effect on the classifier accuracy [23]. Thus, focus-
ing only on the most important arguments (MIST level 2) that
can be used by the classifier to distinguish between malware
and benign software, as done in other studies [17], proves
that analyzing arguments is not an obstacle for the proposed
attack.
5.3 Handling Multiple Feature Types and Hy-
brid Classifiers
Combining several types of features can make the classi-
fier more resistant to adversarial examples against a specific
feature type. For instance, some real-world next generation
anti-malware products are hybrid classifiers, combining both
static and dynamic features for a better detection rate. An
extension of our attack, enabling it to handle hybrid classi-
fiers, is straightforward: attacking each feature type in turn
using Algorithm 3. If the attack against a feature type fails,
we continue and attack the next feature type until a benign
classification by the target model is achieved or all feature
types have been (unsuccessfully) attacked. We used the same
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hybrid malware classifier specified in Appendix C, for which
the input consists of both an API call sequence and the most
frequent 20,000 printable strings inside the PE file as Boolean
features (exist or not).
We evaluated the performance of our decision-based, linear
iteration, benign perturbation attack. When attacking only the
API call sequences using the hybrid classifier, without modi-
fying the static features of the sample, the attack effectiveness
decreases to 23.76%. This is much lower than the attack ef-
fectiveness of 89.67% obtained for a classifier trained only on
the dynamic features, meaning that the attack was mitigated
by the use of additional static features. When attacking only
the printable string features (again, assuming that the attacker
has the knowledge of D′ = D, which contains the printable
strings being used as features by the hybrid classifier), the
attack effectiveness is 28.25%. This is much lower than the
attack effectiveness of 88.31% obtained for a classifier trained
only on the static features. Finally, the multi-feature attack’s
effectiveness for the hybrid model was 90.06%. Other clas-
sifier and attack types provide similar results. They are not
presented here due to space limits.
To summarize, we have shown that while the use of hybrid
models decreases the specialized attacks’ effectiveness, our
suggested hybrid attack performs well, with high attack ef-
fectiveness. While not shown due to space limits, the attack
overhead isn’t significantly affected.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we presented the first black-box attacks (based
on the target classifier’s predicted class, with and without its
confidence score) that generate adversarial sequences while
minimizing the number of queries for the target classifier,
making it suited to attack cloud models. We demonstrated
those attacks against API call sequence-based malware clas-
sifiers and verified the attack effectiveness for all relevant
common classifiers: RNN variants, feedforward networks,
and traditional machine learning classifiers. These are the
first query-efficient attacks effective against RNN variants,
as well as CNNs. We also evaluated our attacks against four
variants of state-of-the-art score-based query-efficient attacks,
modified to fit discrete sequence input, and showed that our
attacks outperform all of them. Finally, we demonstrated that
our attacks are effective even when API call arguments are
analyzed or multiple feature types are used. While this paper
focuses on API calls and printable strings as features, the
proposed attack is valid for every modifiable feature type,
sequence or not. Furthermore, our attack is generic and can
be applied to other domains, like text analysis (using word
sequences instead of API calls).
One might expect that adding random or benign API calls
to a malicious sample would result in lower attack effective-
ness. After all, the malicious API calls around the added API
call remain. However, one should remember that recurrent
neural networks give significance to the context of the mali-
cious API calls, and don’t just take them as a signature, as
done by conventional dynamic analysis systems. The context
importance can also be seen by the lower attack effectiveness
of linear classifiers (SVM and logistic regression) in Table 2,
which don’t have a hidden state like RNNs and are therefore
less affected by the context and more affected by the API
calls themselves. Random perturbations are less effective, as
can be expected by neural networks which are supposed to be
resistant to noise (e.g., because of training with dropout)
Our future work will focus on developing defense mech-
anisms against such attacks. To the best of our knowledge,
there is currently no published and evaluated method to either
detect or mitigate RNN adversarial sequences. Moreover, ex-
isting papers on defense mechanisms against non-sequential
attacks are focused on gradient-based attacks, and thus are
rarely effective against random perturbation attacks. For in-
stance, distillation can mask the gradient, but it has no effect
on the attack if you choose an API call without calculating
the gradient [6] as we have done. Adversarial training [13] is
also less effective against random attacks, because a differ-
ent stochastic adversarial sequence is generated every time,
making it challenging for the classifier to generalize from
one adversarial sequence to another. A comprehensive re-
view of those defense methods and their effectiveness against
stochastic attacks will be a part of our future work.
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Appendix A: Tested Dataset
We used identical implementation details (e.g., dataset, classi-
fiers’ hyperparameters, etc.) as Rosenberg et al. [23], so the
attacks can be compared. The details are provided here for
the reader’s convenience.
An overview of the malware classification process is shown
in Figure 1 (taken from [23]).
The dataset used is large and includes the latest malware
variants, such as the Cerber and Locky ransomware families.
Each malware type (ransomware, worms, backdoors, drop-
pers, spyware, PUAs, and viruses) has the same number of
samples, to prevent a prediction bias towards the majority
class. 20% of the malware families (such as the NotPetya
ransomware family) were only used in the test set to assess
generalization to an unseen malware family. 80% of the mal-
ware families (such as the Virut virus family) were distributed
between the training and test sets, to determine the classi-
fier’s ability to generalize to samples from the same family.
The temporal difference between the training set and the test
set is six months (i.e., all training set samples are older than
the test set samples) based on VirusTotal’s ’first seen’ date.
The ground truth labels of the dataset were determined by
VirusTotal, an online scanning service, which contains more
than 60 different security products. A sample with 15 or more
positive (i.e., malware) classifications from the 60 products
is considered malicious. A sample with zero positive classifi-
cations is labeled as benign. All samples with 1-14 positives
were omitted to prevent false positive contamination of the
dataset. Family labels for dataset balancing were taken from
Kaspersky Anti Virus classifications.
It is crucial to prevent dataset contamination by malware
that detects whether the malware is running in a Cuckoo Sand-
box (or on virtual machines) and if so, quits immediately to
prevent reverse engineering efforts. In those cases, the sam-
ple’s label is malicious, but its behavior recorded in Cuckoo
Sandbox (its API call sequence) isn’t, due to the malware’s
anti-forensic capabilities. To prevent such contamination of
the dataset, two countermeasures were used:
1. Considering only API call sequences with more than
15 API calls, omitting malware that detects a virtual
machine (VM) and quits.
2. Applying YARA rules to find samples trying to detect
sandbox programs, such as Cuckoo Sandbox, and omit-
ting all such samples.
One might argue that the evasive malware that applies such
anti-VM techniques are extremely challenging and relevant,
however in this paper we focus on adversarial attacks. Such
attacks are generic enough to work for those evasive types of
malware as well, assuming that other mitigation techniques
(e.g., anti-anti-VM), would be applied. After this filtering and
balancing of the benign samples about 400,000 valid sam-
ples remained. The final training set size is 360,000 samples,
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Figure 1: Overview of the Malware Classification Process
36,000 of which serve as the validation set. The test set size
is 36,000 samples. All sets are balanced between malicious
and benign samples. Due to hardware limitations, a subset of
the dataset was used (54,000 training samples and test and
validation sets of 6,000 samples each). The dataset was repre-
sentative and maintained the same distribution as mentioned
above.
Appendix B: Tested Malware Classifiers
As mentioned in Section 4.1, we used the malware classifiers
from Rosenberg et al. [23], since many classifiers are cov-
ered, allowing us to evaluate the attack effectiveness against
many classifier types. The maximum input sequence length
was limited to k = 140 API calls, since longer sequence
lengths, e.g., k = 1,000, had no effect on the accuracy, and
shorter sequences were padded with zeros. A zero stands for
a null/dummy value API in our one-hot encoding. Longer
sequences are split into windows of k API calls each, and
each window is classified in turn. If any window is malicious,
the entire sequence is considered malicious. Thus, the input
of all of the classifiers is a vector of k = 140 API call types in
one-hot encoding, using 314 bits, since there were 314 mon-
itored API call types in the Cuckoo reports for the dataset.
The output is a binary classification: malicious or benign. An
overview of the LSTM architecture is shown in Figure 2a.
The Keras implementation was used for all neural net-
work classifiers, with TensorFlow used for the backend. XG-
Boost and scikit-learn were used for all other classifiers. The
loss function used for training was binary cross-entropy. The
Adam optimizer was used for all of the neural networks. The
output layer was fully connected with sigmoid activation for
all neural networks. For neural networks, a rectified linear unit,
ReLU(x) = max(0,x), was chosen as an activation function
for the input and hidden layers due to its rapid convergence
compared to sigmoid() or tanh(), and dropout was used to
improve the generalization potential of the network. A batch
size of 32 samples was used. The classifiers also have the
following classifier-specific hyperparameters:
• DNN - two fully connected hidden layers of 128 neurons,
each with ReLU activation and a dropout rate of 0.2.
• CNN - 1D ConvNet with 128 output filters, a stride
length of one, a 1D convolution window size of three,
and ReLU activation, followed by a global max pooling
1D layer and a fully connected layer of 128 neurons with
ReLU activation and a dropout rate of 0.2.
• RNN, LSTM, GRU, BRNN, BLSTM, and bidirectional
GRU - a hidden layer of 128 units, with a dropout rate
of 0.2 for inputs and recurrent states.
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(a) Dynamic Classifier Architecture
(b) Hybrid Classifier Architecture
Figure 2: Classifier Architecture Overview
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• Deep LSTM and BLSTM - two hidden layers of 128
units, with a dropout rate of 0.2 for inputs and recurrent
states in both layers.
• Linear SVM and logistic regression classifiers - a regu-
larization parameter of C=1.0 and an L2 norm penalty.
• Random forest classifier - 10 decision trees with unlim-
ited maximum depth and the Gini criteria for choosing
the best split.
• Gradient boosted decision tree - up to 100 decision trees
with a maximum depth of 10 each.
The classifiers’ performance was measured using the accuracy
ratio, which gives equal importance to both false positives
and false negatives (unlike precision or recall). The false pos-
itive rate of the classifiers varied between 0.5-1%. The false
positive rate was chosen to be on the high end of production
systems. A lower false positive rate would mean lower recall
either, due to the trade-off between false positive rate and
recall, thereby making our attacks even more effective.
The performance of the classifiers is shown in Table 6. The
accuracy was measured on the test set, which contains 36,000
samples.
Table 6: Classifier Performance
Classifier Type Accuracy (%)
RNN 97.90
BRNN 95.58
LSTM 98.26
Deep LSTM 97.90
BLSTM 97.90
Deep BLSTM 98.02
GRU 97.32
Bidirectional GRU 98.04
Fully Connected DNN 94.70
1D CNN 96.42
Random Forest 98.90
SVM 86.18
Logistic Regression 89.22
Gradient Boosted Decision Tree 91.10
Appendix C: Tested Hybrid Malware Classi-
fiers
As mentioned in Section 5.3, we used the hybrid malware
classifier used in [23], with printable strings inside a PE file
As can be seen in Table 6, the LSTM variants are the
best malware classifiers, in terms of accuracy, and, as shown
in Section 4.2, BLSTM is also one of the classifiers most
resistant to the proposed attack.
as our static features. Strings can be used, e.g., to statically
identify loaded DLLs and called functions, and recognize
modified file paths and registry keys, etc. Our architecture for
the hybrid classifier, shown in Figure 2b, is:
1. A static branch that contains an input vector of 20,000
Boolean values: for each of the 20,000 most frequent
strings in the entire dataset, do they appear in the file
or not? This is analogous to a similar procedure used in
NLP which filters the least frequent words in a language.
2. A dynamic branch that contains an input vector of 140
API calls (each of which is one-hot encoded) inserted
into an LSTM layer of 128 units and a sigmoid activa-
tion function, with a dropout rate of 0.2 for inputs and
recurrent states. This vector is inserted into two fully
connected layers with 128 neurons, a ReLU activation
function, and a dropout rate of 0.2 each.
The 256 outputs of both branches are inserted into a fully
connected output layer with a sigmoid activation function.
Therefore, the input of the classifier is a vector containing
20,000 Boolean values and 140 one-hot encoded API call
types, and the output is malicious or benign classification. All
other hyperparameters are the same as those in Appendix B.
A classifier using only the dynamic branch (Figure 2a)
achieves 92.48% accuracy on the test set, a classifier using
only the static branch attains 96.19% accuracy, and a hybrid
model that uses both branches (Figure 2b) obtains 96.94%
accuracy, meaning that using multiple feature types improves
the accuracy.
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